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Abstract This essay considers the boundaries between the sociology of medicine
and social medicine and the reasons distinctions are maintained between the two
disciplines. To investigate, the essay asks what constitutes the distinction between
social sciences and social medicine, and goes on to question historical distinctions of
how foundational sociology is to social medicine; how much autonomy the sociology of
medicine should have; contemporary challenges to the relation between sociology and
social medicine; and the status of ethics, both traditionally and contemporarily, bet-
ween sociology and social medicine. In the face of increasing emphases on interdisc-
iplinarity, this essay offers a note of caution by demonstrating how the antagonism
between sociology and social medicine is important as a site that produces a necessary
polemic. Ultimately, I argue that the social sciences and social medicine are linked in a
productive relationship that instates and reinstates their respective functions and va-
lues in a process that validates the practice of modern medicine.
Social Theory & Health (2017) 15, 241–260. doi:10.1057/s41285-016-0014-1;
Published online 15 May 2017
Keywords: interdiscplinarity; social medicine; sociology of medicine
The online version of this article is available Open Access
Introduction
Social medicine and the sociology of medicine share a common antecedent; to
conceptualise the social. Despite this, throughout the 20th century, two distinct
traditions have emerged and been maintained through differing career paths
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and titles, funding streams, distinguished pedagogic spaces, departments and
publication houses. This essay asks why we have traditionally made distinc-
tions between the two disciplines, and the productivity of these distinctions.
The essay begins by questioning the status of the sociology of medicine in
contrast to social medicine, and asks in light of the similarities, why sociology is so
often contrasted against social medicine rather than seen as integral? The
distinction between the two is framed in the first part of the essay, by contrasting
the similar historical origins of social medicine and sociology in the 19th century,
with the important disciplinary distinctions that began to emerge by the mid-20th
century. Around the 1950s, across Europe and America political will began to
recognise sociology as important in the medical curriculum and the sociology of
medicine emerged and began to question its own disciplinary position. Founda-
tional work of social medicine from the 1950s questioned whether sociology could
exist as a third branch to medicine. However, this thinking of the 1950s never
managed to defend itself against the establishment of discourses arguing for
disciplinary distinctions, which was typified in 1957 when Strauss (1957)
formulated a much recanted distinction between sociology in medicine and
sociology of medicine. Strauss argued that the social sciences need to uphold
independence from medicine to maintain an alternative perspective of society
aside from the aims of medicine. Since the 1950s, concurrent waves of social
sciences have prioritised reflexivity over closer integration with medicine.
Increasingly, however, these disciplinary distinctions are the cause of contempo-
rary concerns. These concerns are covered in the second part of this essay. For
example, contemporary STS discussions revisit some old questions around
interdisciplinary thinking, the malleability of boundaries and the need for
disciplinary autonomy. In this climate, some like Rose (2013) and Fitzgerald and
Callard (2014) question how arbitrary the stringent maintenance of disciplinary
boundaries (suchasbetween the social sciences andsocialmedicine) is. In thefinal
section of this essay, I counter some contemporary trends by positing alternative
directions of contemporary theory that attempt to consolidate developments in
theory with traditional work in the sociology of medicine aimed at defining its
boundaries. I argue that interdisciplinarity in the social sciences should not
disregard the maintenance of disciplinary autonomy and ethical contrast. To
demonstrate, I point to the ways in which antagonisms between the practice of
social medicine and sociology are productive of innovations in each discipline.
Disciplinary Distinctions
The opening speech for the 2013 conference of the Association for the Social
Sciences and Humanities in HIV (ASSHH) was delivered by Nobel winning
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chemist Françoise Barre´-Sinoussi. As head of the International AIDS Society
(IAS), she had been invited to talk to ASSHH about the place of the social
sciences in the work of the IAS and in their campaign: Working Towards a
Cure (Deeks et al, 2012). Her speech was structured to inform the audience of
‘medical advancements’ that had taken place over the last 30 years of HIV
medicine and the ‘social research’ that had supplemented these ‘achieve-
ments’, and the continued need for this research. The underlying message of
the presentation was:
Since the very early days of the epidemic, social sciences have been key
to understand the social, cultural, political drivers or barriers and
consequently adapt biomedical interventions.1
Discussion about the role and position of the social sciences is trite to
biomedical/social science collaborations and even date right back to the first
meeting of the British Sociological Association (BSA) conference in 1953
(Reid, 1976). HIV medicine constitutes one of the latest parts of this long
tradition but is a good example to use here as a gauge of where the debate has
come as the HIV epidemic is younger than debates between social medicine
and the sociology of medicine, and the social sciences have been at the
forefront throughout the span of the epidemic but with no clear consensus on
its weight or usage. Therefore, I do not wish to challenge this statement head
on (or pose it as an empirical universalism); I seek to understand it better.
Specifically, which social sciences are being conceptualised and alluded to?
My confusion is that here, the social, cultural and political are conceived as
clearly delineated as a distinct sphere. The statement implies that biomedical
interventions occur separately from the social, cultural and political ‘drivers or
barriers’. However, isolating the social, cultural or political into separate
spheres or domains is difficult to place and locate so convincingly (Rosen-
garten, 2009). According to modern developments in social thinking, exactly
which conception of the ‘social’, of the many utilised in medicine, is being
alluded to (Rojas, 2015). Some difficulties of defining ‘the social’ are already
accounted for in the IAS. The IAS already has a working group for social and
political research and the group’s own description acknowledges the difficulty
of delineating social research2. Barre-Sinoussi provokes a thinking point as to
the need for the social sciences as distinct from already well-integrated
branches of social medicine. The establishment of distinctions between the
social sciences and social medicine is not innate and has been continually
reinstated and maintained throughout their history. In 1952 when ‘medical
sociology’ was emerging as a specific field of study, renowned historian Rene´
Sand (1952) argued that there is no great difference between social medicine
and medical sociology. Consequent scholarship has defied this observation by
Social medicine and sociology
 2017 The Authors. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 15, 3, 241–260 243
developing two contrasting ‘social’ positions to medicine, one dependent in
social medicine and the other independent in the sociology of medicine.
These two contrasting positions are no exception in HIV medicine. The
principles behind the foundation of ASSHH (aside and independent from the
IAS) as a specialist social sciences forum and its scope, size and eminence
reflect the persuasiveness of the argument that the medical treatment of HIV
cannot function without engaging with enquiries central to the social sciences
and humanities. Engrained in the ethos of the organisation is an acknowl-
edgment of not just the need for social medicine, but also contrasting social
scientific positions such as those subscribing to the sociology of medicine. The
activities and positioning of most ASSHH members are not isolated easily
between disciplines but span broadly across the philosophical, scientific,
classificatory and practical formulations of medicine3. Therefore, if activities
like HIV treatment require a broad conception of the boundaries between
medicine, society, culture and politics, what determines the imposition of
distinctions in research between social medicine and the sociology of
medicine?
Historical Distinctions
Social medicine and medicalisation
Social medicine and sociology share a common link. The foundation of
sociology coincides with the emergence of social medicine in the 18th and 19th
centuries (Porter, 1997; Porter and Porter, 1988). Over the last two centuries,
sociology, to a greater or lesser extent, has strove to distinguish its place as a
distinct discipline alongside the many activities of contemporary social
medicine which have adapted and used conceptualisations and models of
society.
A classic debate put on the agenda by Foucault (2002) charts the emergence
of ‘social medicine’ in Europe as radicalising medicine from pre-modern era
medicine through its focus on inherently social concepts, and in turn,
profoundly revolutionising the ways in which medicine was conceptualised
and practiced. ‘Social medicine’ antiquated pre-modern understandings of
medicine by emphasising the concept that medicine is applicable to and a
concern over the entire collective of every individual of a given society.
Foucault points to the role that medical categories have played in how we
have come to understand ourselves as particular kinds of subjects:
Medicalization – that is, the fact that starting in the eighteenth century
human existence, human behaviour, and the human body were brought
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into an increasingly dense and important network of medicalization that
allowed fewer and fewer things to escape (Foucault, 2002, p. 135).
The drive allowing for an expansion of a network of medicalisation is the
compulsion to make medical principles applicable to the whole population
and to standardise medicine to every individual. This process relies heavily
upon a conceptualisation of society amongst those practising, planning – and
as much as possible – receiving medicine in order to standardise, enrol and
perpetuate medicine as universally as possible. These emergent understand-
ings of aggregations of collective population salient in the 19th century can be
linked to the impetus for a new body of knowledge to define, explore and
conceive of society (Mazlish, 1999; 1993). Therefore, the social sciences and
social medicine emerged through processes geared towards ordering and
disciplining individual subjects (also see Armstrong, 2002)4. Studies in
medicine encompassing themes common to the social sciences and sociology
can be traced back to the 19th century across Europe and America, and by the
late 19th century medical sociology had emerged as a terminology in
American publications. However, the distinction between the use of this
term and social medicine was not well developed and would lack cohesion
until the process of defining and differentiating the two disciplines was started
in earnest in the 1950s (Bloom, 2002).
Modern developments of this debate contend that there exists a singular
solid ‘medical rationalisation’ specific to all of the medical sciences. Neither
medicine nor society exists in an abstracted domain but must be brought into
being and continually enacted (Mol, 2002; Mol and Law, 2004). This means
that medicine does not exist as a fully formed unaltered domain but is adapted
through the way it is enacted in practice. So in this sense, medicalisation is a
process without one coherent aim but one that must be adapted in practice.
This has sparked a plethora of directions in the sociology of medicine some
seeking to affirm, others to dispute or nuance understandings of medical
dominance (such as Mol, 2008; Latimer, 2015). I wish to argue that
consequently, the antagonism between social medicine and the sociology of
medicine can be seen as co-productive5 of a range of related and opposing
positions.
Viewing social medicine and the sociology of medicine as co-produced is a
shift in the ways disciplines have traditionally been viewed and experienced
by users and initiates the question as to their necessity. Boundaries between
the two disciplines are often maintained as if solid and totally ulterior to each
other. If conceptions of society are really so integral to both sociology and
social medicine how did each discipline come to make such distinguished
boundaries?
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Value and foundation
Throughout the 20th century, the social sciences have continued to question
the position of the boundaries between the two disciplines and the potential of
social medicine. A good example of this can be seen in the political will in the
UK from the mid-20th century that made sociology important to the medical
curriculum. Several significant policy reforms presented the link between
medicine and the study of society as being integrally valuable to each other as
well as raising the question of how society should be integrated and
represented. In 1944, the first recommendation of The Goodenough Report
suggested that social medicine should gain a higher prominence in the
syllabus for training medical students:
The committee recommends: (1) Drastic overhaul of undergraduate
training; more attention to be paid to social medicine, the promotion of
health and the prevention, as well as the cure, of disease, to children’s
health, and to mental health (The Goodenough Committee, 1944,
p. 121).
In the sense given in this report, social medicine is a commitment to the idea
that there are social determinants to illness and medicine (although the full
extent of the conception of ‘the social’ implied is contestable). In this report,
there is an ethos salient of the times that coincides with the instigation of the
UK’s National Health Service (NHS) and the post-world war 2 optimism that
questioned afresh the foundation and value of the concept of ‘society’ as
Europe was under reconstruction. It would initiate further questions around
the relation of medicine to the societies it serves. Following the Goodenough
report, the recommendations of other reports such as the Todd Report (1965)
have had a similar emphasis on social medicine. Therefore, if social medicine
was conceived and put to use during the 19th century, by mid the 20th social
medicine had become a salient question within the medical establishment and
the need for its formalisation was further contemplated. Around the same
period, changing policy and increasing awareness around ‘social medicine’
had also led to corresponding sociological discussions around how to position
the study of social issues in medicine. One of the most evident can be seen at
the first annual BSA conference of 1953, where one discussion suggested that
sociology should become the third basis of medicine alongside the traditional
pillars of art and science (Marshall, 1953, p. 208).
These developments can be highlighted as historical because they not only
place sociology as an integrally valuable companion to medicine but speculate
on integrating social science as a foundational knowledge basis of medicine.
This was also a common sentiment of the middle of the 20th century spread
across Europe and America, for example in 1947 Lord Horder declared to the
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New York Academy of Medicine that through social medicine, ‘medicine is
now of concern to the sociologist’ (Anon, 1947) and similar debates from that
time can be found in Anon (1943), Sand (1952), Platt (1965), and Terris
(1964). These claims may have seemed significant, but few in contemporary
sociology or the medical sciences would consider sociology as crucial or
foundational to medicine today. Contemporary scholars such as Bloom (2002)
are left instead to question why ‘medical sociology’ does not occupy the same
place as, for example, social epidemiology. Bloom’s contemporary question
affirms the position of the social sciences in medicine but is a major revision of
the size and scale of the conceptualisations of sociology in the first BSA
conference. Speculations of sociology as foundational to medicine are now
rhetorical peculiarities. Throughout the 20th century, it seems that as social
medicine has asserted its prominence and importance, sociology has recur-
rently taken up a contrasting role. Biomedicine has asserted its dominance
through the use of conceptualisations of sociality but finds no need to
prioritise sociology as a medical science. The first BSA conference’s dream of
creating a medical science fully responsive to its own use and service to
society through sociology has never been fully realised.
Disciplinary autonomy
Since the 1950s, sociology and social medicine have only seemed to grow into
greater disaccord. Instrumentally, from the 1950s, medical sociology has
asserted its independence in contrast to social medicine. The question of
sociology’s applicability to social medicine has complexified through the
development of reflexive methodologies that seek to problematise the
relationship between the researcher and the ‘society’ they represent (May,
1999). Conversely, the scope of biomedical advancements attempt to offer
evermore ‘complete’ explanations. Two clear examples are contemporary
accounts of neuroscience and genetics, which claim ever more explanatory
power over questions of humanity and the definition of what it is to be human
(Keating, 2006). The result is that sociologists have sought to distinguish
social enquiries from the scope of medicine and bring into question the
cohesion between social medicine and contemporary sociology. In effect, not
only are the methodologies of sociology and social medicine different, but
they also hold different understandings of society. In the face of fears of
biomedicine becoming more totalising, some sociologists have intensified
distinctions about what constitutes the boarders (Levinson, 2005). Traditional
social medicine now forms its own spheres of study with distinct branches
such as social epistemology and psychosocial studies apart from sociology.
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These questions can be related to much earlier insights on the role of the
social sciences in medicine. One now classic distinction is posed by Straus
(1957) between the sociology of medicine and sociology in medicine:
We suggest that the sociology of medicine is concerned with studying
such factors as the organizational structure, role relationships, value
systems, rituals, and functions of medicine as a system of behaviour and
that this type of activity can best be carried out by persons operating
from independent positions outside the formal medical setting. Sociology
in medicine consists of collaborative research or teaching often involving
the integration of concepts, techniques and personnel from many
disciplines. (Straus, 1957, p. 204).
This has become one of the most significant foundational statements of the
field. Rather than assuming the preoccupations of the first BSA conference
3 years earlier to unify the social sciences with medicine, Straus acknowledges
a distinction between sociology which must be maintained as independent
from social medicine in order to achieve an independent perspective. A
contemporary reading of Straus’s idea of disciplinary ‘Independence’ may
contest the difficulty of defining or attaining such a pure split between the
two. One discipline will always reference another, but it is this process of
demarcating parameters and defining distinctions that gives each discipline its
relevance amongst others. Therefore, a modern interpretation of Straus could
understand independence instead as the maintenance of a disciplinary
autonomy continuously defined and redefined by users in relation to
counter-claims. In this sense, users are disciplined and disciplining in their
interpretations of knowledge.
Barre´-Sinoussi’s role for the social sciences is confusing as to if it alludes to
sociology in medicine or of medicine. Straus’s work can be directly contrasted
against the reports of the 1950s detailed above, and gives some insight into
why sociology has imposed such distinctions on the use of the social sciences
in medicine. Back in 1957, Straus’s fear was that sociologists who attempt to
adjust their enquiry to the aims readily expected by medicine risk losing their
focus on society and the alternative perspectives it can have on medicine. As
the social sciences have developed and adapted themselves, Straus’s insight
has been taken forwards as a central concern of the field and made more
acute. It is a constraint and fear that has been recited prominently over the
years, for example, Reid (1976), Gold (1977) and Timmermans (2013). The rift
between sociology and social medicine can be traced back to these discussions
on the level of autonomy and pragmatism between sociology of medicine and
sociology in medicine. Straus’s distinction is not specifically addressed
towards social medicine, but it opens the way for concerns about how
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individuals professing to work on society conceptualise and utilise under-
standings of society, and encompasses perspectives now more closely aligned
to social medicine.
What is at stake for sociology is the ability to conduct enquiries that are
beyond the scope of, or not immediately applicable to social medicine. Some
like Rosenfield (1992) point to the functions that sociology geared towards
making medical recommendations fail to make:
very useful for short-term problem solving, less so for longer-term
programmatic changes, especially beyond the health sector, and even
more limited in impact on theory building for coping with the changing
human condition.
The point confirms why sociology is at a disposition to defend its boundaries.
If, as argued, medicine has drawn upon concepts of society since the 18th and
19th centuries, as part of the same process, sociology, once emerging as
distinct from the same revolutionising gambit of the human sciences, would
have to strive from being subsumed by the same processes that instate and
maintain medicine as important, thus initiating a co-productive relationship.
In so doing, the approach to ontology, epistemology and methodology in the
social sciences has developed autonomously and is not always compatible
with social medicine. By maintaining their autonomy, sociology has fostered a
sustained disciplinary practice able to raise the awareness of the effects of
epistemes and resulting practice beyond their immediate application6. In the
case of the sociology of medicine this means garnering reflexive perspectives
able to conceptualise and question medical processes (good examples of this
tradition are Timmermans and Berg, 1997; Timmermans and Epstein, 2010).
To maintain this awareness, sociology and social medicine should not be
merged seamlessly, their distinctiveness and identity needs to be maintained,
and users should have the freedom to contest the notion of ‘objectivity’ or the
practicality of ‘reflexive’ methodologies. It can also be argued that sociologists
ultimately gain much of their identity from defending and defining themselves
against social medicine whilst offering their own contestations. Therefore, it
stands to reason that the traditional approach to collaborations between
medicine and the social sciences, such as the one suggested by Barre´-Sinoussi,
is not concerned with fully resolving the contestations between the
disciplines. Instead, I argue that rather than resolving contestations, sociology
has maintained disciplinary autonomy and distinctiveness through exploring
contestations to generate contrasting insights on society. However, no single
defined boundary can ever be fully achieved.
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Contemporary Resolutions and Concerns
Contemporary challenges
However, these traditional distinctions between sociology and social medicine
are under increasing challenge by contemporary theory. Some 21st century
currents of methodology in Science and Technology Studies (STS) surround
the productive effect of forming specific epistemes and methodologies.
Latour’s (1987) modern classic, science in action, argues that authoritative
knowledge within disciplines is formed through a deliberated process of
assembling the most convincing ‘human and non-human allies’ to distinguish
one account over others. This has led leading figures in STS to question the
extent to which disciplinary distinctions are malleable. Most evident is a
collected volume by Barry and Born (2013), featuring the works of Jansanoff,
Pickering and Schaffer amongst others united in the commendation of STS as
allied to forgoing arbitrary disciplinary boundaries. Regarding social inquiry as
an assemblage of allies suggests that disciplinary boundaries must be
maintained and that the boundaries between disciplines are negotiable. What
is implied is that disciplines are not inherently fixed around central (a priori)
questions or methods, but are open and aggregated around the point where
enactions within a discipline reach consensus as to what they wish to achieve
and what is within their scope (in accordance with the principle of radical
symmetry as referred to in STS terminology). It suggests that knowledge does
not have one coherent rationale that can unite all knowledge or fix them
together in one system, but instead suggests that knowledge must be
produced and has the potential to be conflicting and contradictory depending
upon the task it is produced to fulfil. From an STS standpoint, knowledge is
heterogeneous and cannot be separated purely into one disciplinary assem-
blage or another, for example, social assemblages will always rely on technical
assemblages for definition and vice versa.
Traditionally, the social sciences have maintained their distinctiveness
through fostering contrasting insights on society and medicine. Therefore, any
collaboratory work between the two disciplines that aspires to be sociology of
medicine rather than sociology in medicine struggles with the question of
autonomy. Rather than continuing to see autonomy as problematic, STS logic
aims to make research decisions based on what is to be achieved and intended
outcomes. Within the logic of STS methodology there is no core independence
to sociology that must be maintained, rather both disciplines must have their
relevance to each other, and dominance over each other continually tested
and re-evaluated7. For the benefit of both disciplines each one must be able to
contend with and counter the demands of the other. Forging antagonistic
Boulton
250  2017 The Authors. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 15, 3, 241–260
collaborations is a key site where each discipline is aligned and challenged.
Viewed in this way, the preconceptions of Barre´-Sinoussi become an
invitation to overlook disciplinary distinctions and affirm exactly what the
social sciences have to offer the areas identified by Barre´-Sinoussi (or
challenge why they are incorrect), and find common solutions.
However, the implication is concerning. It conceals another inherent
totalising motive parallel to the motives (such as medicalisation) the social
sciences are supposedly in charge of policing8. Conceiving disciplinary logic as
an assemblage constructs a vantage point that continues to imagine the
existence of a logic charged with organising all things placed before it into one
system. Paradoxically, however flexible the system imagined, this malleable
logic is even a motive that allows us to forgo the absence of universal truth as
a universal truth. It may even be impossible to avoid totalisations; some
modern theorists like Sloterdijk (2013) even advocate that philosophy should
aim to be narrative and totalising, the point is that being aware of
totalisations, however much this is possible, gives some indication as to the
totalities limits. Therefore, I am not refuting STS’s insight on disciplinarity, I
am refuting the conclusion that this should advocate non-disciplinarity.
Rather I would see STS as a useful tool to understand how sociology and social
medicine are co-produced, without eroding why disciplines have traditionally
found it important to maintain a boundary or distinction. As social medicine
claims ongoing explanatory ‘advancements’ it opens contrasting space to
counter these claims. Therefore, I throw caution on the use of STS as inviting
sociology to forgo contradictions and seek solutions, as it obscures reflections
on the underlying totalising motives certain conceptions of society may have.
Antagonistic relations
One interpretation of STS methodologies such as Latour’s approach advocates
bringing sociology more in line with the natural sciences9. However, I wish to
reconsider what STS’s stance on the inseparability of disciplines might imply
for social medicine and the sociology of medicine. Rather than using STS to
rethink disciplinary compatibilities (not to say it is not important), I want to
highlight ways that the antagonisms between social medicine and the
sociology of medicine can be considered as productive of important
ontological and epistemological contrasts. To do this I will consider in what
ways this antagonism has been manifested in contemporary debates.
Professor Nicholas Rose (2013) was invited to talk at an event hosted by the
Centre of the Body about collaborations between the social sciences and the
‘life sciences’, and what the social sciences can offer to the life sciences10. The
central questions of the event were:
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How should or might we respond as scholars of the humanities to the
rising prominence of the neurosciences? Does this open up the
opportunity for collaboration and if so, what kinds of collaboration
might be possible?
As was suggested by Rose, the social sciences and humanities are often
treated as the ‘handmaidens’ of the life sciences. What was meant by this was
that the contributions of the social sciences and humanities are often reduced
by the life sciences to contributions on ‘‘social and ethical implications and
public engagement’’ (Rose n.d., 47.51 m). During the talk, Rose made the
controversial recommendation that the social sciences ‘‘need to take seriously
the ‘truths’ the life-sciences are generating about the human body and the
human brain’’ in order to improve the disciplines standing in relation to the
life sciences (Rose n.d., 17.20). Rose (2001) even questions the social sciences
position to give poignant ethical deliberations:
I do not think that, today, the most far-reaching ethical innovations
concerning our relations to ourselves are being made in the deliberations
of the bioethicists and moral philosophers – they are being made within
medical and biomedical thought and technique itself. (2001, p. 20).
For Rose, what is at stake is how sociological accounts of the human are to
proceed when so much of what we understand ourselves as human subjects
comes from e.g. the neurobiological or genomic sciences. He questions
whether the formation of contemporary large-scale scientific projects, in
which ‘ethical legal or social implications’ are rigorously separated out from
scientific questions, and handed to a technical staff of moral philosophers,
actually serve either science or ethics well – and whether, more broadly, such
an apparatus represents an especially bright future for the social sciences.
According to Rose, many of the traditional approaches of the social sciences
that serve to counterpoise the life sciences through reflexivity (the bodies of
knowledge Foucault has inspired was specifically singled out during the talk)
have historically caused antagonistic relations between the social sciences and
the life sciences, and that if these arbitrary distinctions were overlooked, the
social sciences could be aligned with the aims of the life sciences and help
foster more equal collaborations (also see Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013;
Fitzgerald and Callard, 2014). Rose’s claims are important because it provokes
a re-evaluation of the traditional relationships sociology has had with social
medicine. Although the exact place where Rose’s work sits alongside STS can
be debated, his re-evaluation is in line with STS’s attempts to align the social
sciences and natural science more closely. Rose asks for a careful deliberation
as to the usefulness of the enforcement of distinctions between the disciplines.
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In this deliberation, I would like to add that the sociology of medicine has
emerged through the same processes as social medicine and evolved with
social medicine to act as a retort to the ongoing claims and highlight
contradictions in understandings of society, or in implications to society
arising from perceived ‘objective’ scientific ‘developments’ or ‘advance-
ments’. Sociology will necessarily be contentious (as well as necessarily
ethical and political) when reacting to ongoing scientific ‘advancements’. In
this sense, I do not wish to negate the STS principle that disciplines do not
have a stable a priori ‘core’ or ‘centre’ but instead consider how the principle
can be interpreted differently. Rather than asserting that the boundary should
be obscured, I would like to argue that to focus on sociology’s contrast to
social medicine serves a purpose to obtain alternative scholarly dialogues that
are especially pertinent to ethics (or ‘bioethics’). My contention is that both
disciplines should have awareness in collaboratory work that dispels any
ambiguity of the importance of the social sciences pursuing alternative
epistemologies. In accordance to the longstanding debates drawn on in the
opening sections, the social sciences need to maintain their antagonism to
safeguard the production of heterogenic perspectives. An important assurance
that both epistemes will reflect on totalisms comes from them having some
kind of opposition to the other. Therefore, downgrading the importance of
sociology’s focus on ethics or politics, especially as applied to medicine, is a
miscalculation of the subject that sociology has unavoidably been charged
with attempting to understand and study.
Other Theoretical Directions
Methodological Contradictions: Ethics
A contemporary reading of Peter Winch (Winch, 1972, 1958) still raises some
important enquiries about the difficulty of assessing ethics separately to
society. However, much of Winch’s legacy has given way to scrutiny since
publication (or distortion through association with social constructionism and
the resulting fallout from the ‘science wars’), for example, STS criticism
centres on Winch’s over-emphasis on language before practical or techno-
logical activities in social life (Bloor, 1983), or the conservatism of Winch’s
main thesis around the importance of philosophy over science within the
social sciences (see Hutchinson et al, 2008; Lerner, 2013 for a full discussion).
Instead, I want to review the principle:
I argue […] that any such conception of a world to be understood is
intelligible only against the back-ground of a way (or ways) in which
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men live together and understand each other […] Moral ideas can only
be understood in a context of social life. p. 3.
The implication of this statement is that ethics and morals cannot exist
independent of the processes that make them intelligible. That to interpret
society one cannot step outside of the ethical bounds which interpret and
understand them. I do not wish to reanimate Winch at the expense of STS,
rather I have chosen to highlight Winch to demonstrate that similar concerns
around meanings or ethics not having an a priori existence outside of their
enaction have been on the sociological agenda since the 1950s (and is
contemporary with the emergence of the sociology of medicine in the 1950s)
and have been used to support disciplinary distinctions rather than interdis-
ciplinarity. References to or usages of the concept of society imply some sort of
ethical structure, and vice versa, references to or usages of ethics derive from
their relation to society or societal ideals. Ethics are the unassailable product
and effect of endeavouring to accurately study, evaluate or describe society.
Longstanding trends in the social sciences have called to transcend ethics.
From inception to current trends, the social sciences have a long history of
attempting to organise or situate ethics in terms of positivistic science with
varying success11. Any attempt to circumnavigate ethical deliberations or
decouple ethics, risks obscuring a long lineage within the short history of the
social sciences (Haimes and Williams, 2007; Turner, 2013). Therefore, can
collaborations or disciplinary boundaries be assembled that offer a contrast to
social medicine which avoid epistemological antagonisms?
In the opening section, Barre´-Sinoussi places ethics within the realm of the
social sciences, as argued, the social sciences may never be fully disentangled
from social medicine, but the invitation to study epistemological and ethical
contrasts should be appreciated by sociologists12. The IAS positions ethics in
the organisation as integral to all research activities and has set up a dedicated
multi-disciplinary working group (The IAS Ethics Working Group et al, 2013).
Although this may mean that the social sciences risk gaining their definition
through social medicine, antagonisms between the two are productive in
forming contrasting epistemologies.
At their most applied, both sociology and social medicine work towards
ordering all aspects of (that which is understood as) human existence into
totalising contrasting systems. Traditionally, sociologists have produced their
disciplinary boundaries as a contrast to social medicine. After at least 50 years
of debate these standpoints may now be questioned as non-complicit or
antagonistic, but in the sense detailed in this essay, these standpoints have
been necessary. Sociology has a co-productive relationship to contrast social
medicine, and as a result has made possible an insight into the scope and
Boulton
254  2017 The Authors. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 15, 3, 241–260
impact of medicine beyond enquiries immediately applicable to medicine,
allowing social medicine to proceed with practice. The antagonism whereby
sociology recurrently contests the ‘objectivity’ of social medicine and where
social medicine scrutinises critical sociology’s relevance to medical practice is
co-productive. If each position seeks some countenance to the other each
discipline losses much of their ability to totalise.
Barre´-Sinoussi’s address to ASSHH posed at the beginning of this essay
prescribes a curious role for the social sciences. The role she prescribes to the
social sciences and the antagonism it causes is responsible for producing a
border between the disciplines as it forces sociologists engaging with the field
to consider their relation to biomedicine, and how their contribution may or
may not be sociological and distinguished from social medicine. Enacting the
boundary in this way may often seem antagonistic or counter-intuitive, but it
is an important productive mechanism – sociology should not fit neatly into all
research agendas. Sociology should be cautious about the type of ‘science’
that it pursues, the nature of collaborations it builds and the place of ethics in
the discipline. In the words of Law and Urry (2004), the social sciences ‘‘do
not simply describe the world as it is, but also enact it’’, and that ‘‘if social
investigation makes worlds, then it can, in some measure, think about the
worlds it wants to help to make’’ (also see Law, 2007). Therefore, what should
not be obscured are lessons learnt and deemed important since the social
sciences were put on the medical syllabus in the 1950s, namely the
importance of maintaining boundaries in sociology when the question of
the social sciences being an integral branch of medicine were fresh.
Conclusion
This essay has discussed the reasons behind the maintenance of disciplinary
boundaries between sociology and social medicine. It has detailed some of the
key historical momentums behind why boundaries have been maintained and
the compatibility between current interdisciplinary agendas and the tradi-
tional aims of the sociology of medicine. Much of which hinging upon and
stemming from the development of the medical curriculum across America
and Europe and the importance placed on the sociology of medicine’s
independence since the 1950s.
The boundary between the sociology of medicine and social medicine is
significant because of the intricate implications it holds for ethics and the limits
to the explanatory power of each discipline. One result of this essay is that it
questions the amount of intelligent oversight possible over the boundaries
between disciplines. Is the boundary a by-product of individuals working
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towards the goals of their disciplines, and to what extent can individuals mould
the boundary lines as they understand them? The answer lies concealed over the
entire range of possible positions. Nevertheless, the line is organised, but the
significance of the argument remains; many ways of practicing knowledge exist
under the positions of both sociology and social medicine13, and their
contrasting co-existence is testament to their being many approaches to the
human experience and human knowledge. The loss of epistemological
contradictions would risk limiting the range of possible ethical oppositions.
The boundary is especially important because it touches on several tropes
between social medicine and sociology, which question how do we value the
work carried out in each discipline. In the UK, this question has come under
the guise of ‘impact’, which specifically exerts pressure on all social sciences
to prove their value14.
Instead of engaging head on with questions around ‘impact’ I have
attempted to answer the question why have disciplines developed and been
maintained as distinct, but there is an obvious white elephant in the room; the
problem is that disciplines are not equal; they are not equally funded; each
disciplines status is often not equally regarded; their extent and scope is not
the same; individual’s eminence and pay grades are not the same. This means
that the boundaries are not as open and malleable as could be ideally
imagined, and these inequalities may also offer answers on why boundaries
are enacted in certain ways. This essay however, appeals to the choices that
are available when enacting boundaries however slim. The main point of the
essay remains unaffected: interdisciplinarity should not obscure contrasting
ethical accounts, and strong disciplinary oppositions that are routed in the
production of opposing disciplinary focuses should not be discouraged.
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Notes
1 Taken from the 2013 ASSHH Paris Conference Guidebook. Barre-Sinoussi’s main social science
goals related to reducing stigma and barriers to treatment.
2 http://www.iasociety.org/Default.aspx?PageId=572.
3 The work of Sue Kippax serves as a compelling example (Race, 2008).
4 Related to medicalisation, as demonstrated here and presented in 1974, is a much more
popular series of lectures from 1976 on biopolitics (Foucault, 2004). I have purposefully chosen
to highlight medicalisation over biopolitics as it more readily highlights totalism and the
relations on social sciences and medicine and totalism. Foucault’s notion of biopolitics offers
more development of the far-reaching effect of humanism on society but my aim is not to
further or counter these perspectives. That is done better elsewhere see (Rose, 2001; Latimer,
2015). Instead, I wish to highlight the debates on historical importance in the development of
the sociology of medicine.
5 I have in mind Jansenoff’s idea of co-production: ‘‘Briefly stated, co-production is shorthand
for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world are inseparable
from the ways in which we choose to live in it’’ (Jansenoff p. 2)
6 Stengers (2000), gives a warning to the social sciences attempting to define sciences as cultural
as being in danger of being a super science that explains all other sciences.
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7 This exploration is inspired by the work of Stengers (1997, 2000, 2003) whose work traces the
ongoing ‘invention’ of the sciences and explains that the process of inventing science
necessitates a productive tension between ‘objectivity’ and ‘belief’.
8 Both Radder (1992) and Fraser (2006) raise cautions about the ethical overtones of Latour’s
approach to knowledge production.
9 Such is the aim of Latour (2005) and is discussed in Barry and Born (2013).
10 http://magiclantern.gold.ac.uk/podcasts/centreofthebody/centreforthebody1.mp3.
11 Consider the founding fathers of Compte and Durkheim’s vision for sociology and the Religion
of Humanity. Contradictorily, as classically stated, society must add up to more than its
constituent parts.
12 This is not to suggest that the social sciences do not already engage with ethics as the rapidly
rising discipline of ‘bioethics’ with its own paradigms and problematics is testament, but to
highlight the continued importance of doing so (Vries et al, 2007).
13 Karl Popper (1974) famously demonstrates that the term ‘science’ traditionally has a broader
etymology than simply the empirical sciences.
14 Consider Research Councils UK’s extensive impact requirements: http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/ke/
impacts/.
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